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Abstract  
Purpose: The article discusses the implication of money laundering preventive measures for financial privacy, 
with the focus on banking secrecy. 
Design/methodology/approach: This article, first, sets out the principal measures imposed on financial service 
providers to prevent money laundering. The interaction between the preventive measures and the desire for financial 
privacy is then discussed.  
Findings: The adequate implementation of the preventive measures is highly important for financial institutions 
to be secure from money laundering. Nonetheless, the enforcement of these measures is becoming much more 
intrusive into financial privacy. In practice, financial privacy should be weighted fairly against the objectives of 
preventive measures.  
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1. Introduction  
A set of preventive measures imposed on financial institutions, which aims at uncovering 
opportunities offered by the legitimate environment to facilitate money laundering, is an 
important and indispensable part of the anti-money laundering (AML) regime. The key measures 
include customer due diligence (CDD), record keeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions. 
These measures have the objectives of deterring and detecting criminals from using financial 
institutions for laundering the proceeds of crime. The rationale behind the implementation of 
these measures is that: i) criminals often make use of financial institutions, especially the 
banking system, as the main intermediaries for money laundering operations; ii) the interaction 
with the legitimate environment is seen as a “weak point” in the stages of money laundering, at 
which law enforcement agencies can intervene for deterring and detecting money launderers; iii) 
the integrity of financial service providers, which contributes significantly to public confidence, 
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must be protected from money laundering involvement; and iv) nobody in the legitimate 
environment should profit from criminals. 
CDD, record keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions are provided for in both 
“hard laws” (e.g., article 7 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (UN, 2000b) and article 14 of the United Convention against Corruption (UN, 2003)) and 
“soft laws” (the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and initiatives of other 
international organizations). It should be noted that the provisions of the “hard laws” are drafted 
in a general manner since they build on on-going international initiatives to combating money 
laundering (UNODC, 2004, p. 50), and "States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the 
relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money 
laundering” (UN, 2000b). The relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral 
organizations refer in particular to the FATF Recommendations and initiatives of other 
international organizations (UN, 2000a). In fact, the FATF, in its Recommendations and their 
revisions, has detailed and developed extensively the preventive measures. Because of that, this 
article focuses on examining the preventive measures provided for in the FATF 
Recommendations. 
 
2. Concepts of customer due diligence and know your customer 
It appears that the use of terms “Customer Due Diligence” and “Know Your Customer” 
(KYC) is sometimes confusing. It is necessary to clarify the meaning of these terms through 
examining the history and the development of these concepts. 
The term “due diligence” has its origins in Anglo-American law, particularly in the statutory 
regulations controlling the capital market in the United States (US) (Picot, 2002, p. 154). 
Originally the due diligence concept appeared in security laws designed to protect investors. It 
then has evolved into the systematic and professional investigation of business opportunities and 
risks during on-going sale negotiations (Picot, 2002, pp. 154-55). It may entail financial, 
marketing, human resources, legal and tax, environmental and organizational due diligence 
(Picot, 2002, pp. 155-78). In other words, the object of the due diligence process is to obtain 
information on and engage in evaluation of the background of a target company including its 
structure, the capabilities of its employees, its market opportunities and risks (Picot, 2002, p. 
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178). With regard to CDD, it normally refers to the investigation procedure of a new customer’s 
background conducted by the financial institution prior to doing business with the new customer.  
The term “Know Your Customer” and the “KYC guidelines” originated in a legislative report 
on the US Bank Secrecy Act, but they were not defined in that report and no examples were 
given to illustrate what KYC means (Mulligan, 1998, p. 2358). Since 1970, the US government 
has deployed US banks as the principal agencies to track down the proceeds of crime by 
imposing an obligation to know their customers and to report suspicious transactions (Grant, 
1995, p. 227). As a result of this, KYC principles and KYC guidelines have evolved and become 
ingrained in the US AML regime as tools for banks to: i) prevent criminals from presenting as 
their legitimate customers; and ii) reveal the illicit nature of a customer’s business (Mulligan, 
1998, p. 2358).  
The FATF and other international institutions (e.g., the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) have worked intensively on the KYC issue which “is most closely associated with 
the fight against money laundering” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001, p. 2). In 
1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the Statement on Prevention of 
Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering including the 
principle of “Customer Identification”. It called for reasonable effort by the international banking 
community to determine the true identity of all customers requesting their services (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, p. 3). In 1990, the first version of the 40 FATF 
Recommendations provided an initiative to combat the misuse of the financial system for 
laundering the proceeds of drug-related crimes (FATF, 1990). This version and the later revised 
ones (in 1996, 2003 and 2012) recommend various measures to prevent financial institutions, 
certain other businesses and professions from involving money laundering. The FATF uses the 
term “Customer Due Diligence” or “Identification of Customer” instead of “Know Your 
Customer” to refer to the preventive measures. In 2001, after identifying the deficiencies in a 
large number of countries’ KYC principles for banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2001, p. 1), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision revised the KYC principles to make 
them more applicable to all countries. In the CDD for Banks, the scope of the Basel Committee’s 
approach to KYC has been expanded with a view to serving not only AML but also the effective 
management of banking risks. KYC involves more extensive due diligence for higher risk 
accounts, and includes proactive account monitoring for suspicious activities (Basel Committee 
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on Banking Supervision, 2001, p. 1). In short, KYC and CDD have been introduced as evolving 
concepts designed to be adaptable and effective for use in both banks and other financial 
institutions. These terms do not have a fixed content, and they frequently appear to be used 
interchangeably. However, CDD is often used to refer to a standard that is broader than KYC 
(Koker, 2006, pp. 28-29). KYC could be conceived of as the specific CDD standard imposing on 
banks and other financial institutions the duty to identify their customers.  
 
3. International standards of CDD and record keeping  
3.1 The FATF Recommendations 
The leading standards of CDD for the purposes of fighting money laundering and terrorist 
financing have been set out by the FATF. The FATF has amended its recommendations together 
with a glossary and interpretative notes that define and clarify comprehensively the CDD 
standards applied to financial institutions.  
According to the 2012 FATF Recommendations (Recommendation (R)10(i), (ii), (iii), and 
(iv)) (FATF, 2012), a financial institution should be required to undertake CDD measures when: 
 
1) Establishing business relations;  
2) Carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated threshold (US$/EUR 15,000); or 
(ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 16;  
3) There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or  
4) The financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data.  
 
The CDD measures to be taken are as follows (R10(a), (b), (c), and (d)) (FATF, 2012): 
 
a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source 
documents, data or information. 
b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial 
owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal 
persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions understanding the ownership and control 
structure of the customer.  
c) Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship.  
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d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken 
throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with 
the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the 
source of funds. 
 
The 2012 FATF Recommendations and their interpretative notes especially emphasize the use 
of CDD in regard to legal persons and arrangements. They recommend that financial institutions 
should verify and identify any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer, the beneficial 
owners and the trustee (Interpretive Note to Recommendation (INR) 10, part (B), (C), and (D)) 
(FATF, 2012). Further, financial institutions should perform enhanced due diligence on higher 
risk categories of customers, such as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). But they also provide 
that simplified or reduced CDD measures may be applied to lower risk customers, such as 
financial institutions or public companies under rigorous regulation, government administration 
or enterprises (INR 10, pars. 16-18, (FATF, 2012)).  
The obligation of record keeping requires that financial institutions keep customer 
identification and records of financial transactions. The database of this information which can 
be accessible by law enforcement authorities when required is extremely helpful for the 
investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences. In their investigations, law 
enforcement bodies normally need to follow the trails of the movement of criminal proceeds, 
which can be revealed through the records kept by the financial service providers involved. Thus, 
record keeping can serve a repressive approach effectively. 
R11 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations states that: 
 
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both 
domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent 
authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the 
amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of 
criminal activity.  
Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained through the customer due 
diligence process (e.g., copies or records of official identification documents like passports, identity cards, 
driving licenses or similar documents), account files and business correspondence, including the results of 
any analysis undertaken (e.g., inquiries to establish the background and purpose of complex, unusual large 




Financial institutions should be required by law to maintain records on transactions and information obtained 
through the CDD measures. 
The CDD information and the transaction records should be available to domestic competent authorities upon 
appropriate authority. 
 
3.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
As one of the primary requirements in bank supervision, a comprehensive set of standards of 
CDD for banks has been developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that 
contains four basic elements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001, pp. 6-14):  
 
1) Customer acceptance policy: This requires banks to develop clear customer acceptance policies and 
procedures, including a description of the types of customers that are likely to pose a higher than average risk to a 
bank. Factors, such as customers’ background, country of origin, public or high profile position, linked accounts, 
business activities or other risk indicators should be considered in preparing this policy. More extensive CDD should 
be required for higher risk customers. 
2) Customer identification: Banks should obtain satisfactory information about the identity of a new customer 
and the purpose of the business relationship. The adequacy of information depends on the type of applicant and 
anticipated size of accounts. Special requirements of information are required when implementing CDD measures 
on PEPs and non-face-to-face customers. 
3) On-going monitoring of high-risk accounts: Banks should have an understanding of normal and reasonable 
account activity of their customers so that they can recognize and report suspicious transactions to the competent 
authorities. This on-going monitoring mainly aims at higher risk accounts.  
4) Risk management: The channels for reporting suspicious transactions should be clearly specified for effective 
communication. The roles of internal audit and employee-training programmes should be emphasized for insuring 
effective risk management. Bank staff should have an adequate on-going training about CDD procedures. Audit 
functions should be staffed adequately because internal audit plays an important role in evaluating risk 
management. 
 
It is noticeable that the very broad definition of “customer” in “Customer Due Diligence for 
Banks” issued by the Basel Committee in 2001 includes: i) the person or entity that maintains an 
account with the bank or those on whose behalf an account is maintained (i.e. beneficial owners); 
ii) the beneficiaries of transactions conducted by professional intermediaries; and iii) any person 
or entity connected with a financial transaction who can pose a significant reputational risk or 
other risks (operational, legal and concentration risk)  to the bank (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001, p. 6). 
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Beside the Basel Committee which has focused on CDD standards for the banking system, 
other international associations of financial regulators have also specifically defined the CDD 
standards or the CDD process for banks and other kinds of financial institutions consistent with 
the FATF Recommendations.  
In 2000, the Wolfsberg Group published the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles 
for Private Banking (revised in 2002 and 2012) which contains the essential global AML 
guidelines for private banking (Wolfsberg Group, 2012). It sets out the core guidelines in terms 
of CDD requirements for the client and the beneficial owner (Wolfsberg Group, 2012, pp. 2-3). 
Additional due diligence is required in some situations, such as business in relation to clients 
from high-risk countries (which have inadequate AML standards or where there is a high risk of 
crime and corruption) or business involving public officials. 
 In 2004, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) introduced its 
Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry, which 
states that “the CDD process is a key component of securities regulatory requirements intended 
to achieve the principal objectives of securities regulation, the protection of investors; ensuring 
that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the prevention of the illegal use of the 
securities industry” (IOSCO, 2004, p. 2). The CDD process should be applied by the authorized 
securities service providers to: identify their clients and beneficial owners; obtain adequate 
information about their clients’ circumstances and investment objectives; and keep records of 
this information (IOSCO, 2004, p. 2). Although the main objectives of this process are to prevent 
securities fraud and market abuse, the application of the CDD process in the securities industry 
also contributes to the prevention of the illegal use of the securities industry for the purposes of 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism (IOSCO, 2004, p. 2). 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), in 2003, revised the Insurance 
Core Principles and Methodology by adding new principles addressing supervisory standards 
related to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
(IAIS, 2003). In 2004, the IAIS issued the Guidance Paper on AML/CFT which contains a 
specific description of the CDD process as core measures against money laundering and 





4. Reporting obligation 
The effectiveness of a national AML system is essentially dependent on whether the relevant 
competent authorities have adequate information on the funds and financial transactions to which 
suspicions of money laundering arise. This information usually comes from three main sources 
(Thony, 1996, p. 258): i) mandatory reports provided by persons and institutions covered by law; 
ii) databases available for access (computer databases for the most part); and iii) information 
exchanged with other AML authorities. Among these sources, mandatory reporting is a crucial 
prerequisite for an effective AML strategy for a range of reasons. First, money laundering itself 
is a crime without direct victims. The information provided by institutions and professions, who 
are commonly vulnerable to money laundering, is extremely critical to the prevention and 
investigation of money laundering. Second, money laundering is normally accompanied by the 
carrying out of financial transactions through financial institutions which maintain certain 
privacy standards. As a result, law enforcement authorities find it difficult to get information 
about these transactions. Thus, financial institutions should be subject to the mandatory 
obligation of reporting suspicious funds or transactions. 
Under the reporting obligation, reporting entities are required to analyse the funds and 
financial transactions involved, then assess whether the funds or transactions raise suspicions. 
These funds or transactions deemed suspicious must then be reported to the competent 
authorities. R20 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations reads: “if a financial institution suspects or 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related 
to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its 
suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU)”. 
The Wolfsberg Group, in their Wolfsberg AML Principles on Private Banking, refers to 
“unusual or suspicious transactions” undertaken in the banking system that may include 
(Wolfsberg Group, 2012, p. 6):  
 
1) Account transactions or other activities which are not consistent with the due diligence file; 





It should be stressed that there is no international consensus on the criteria for identifying 
suspicious transactions. The international instruments leave room for States to set out their own 
criteria for identifying suspicious transactions.  
The onerous burden has been imposed on financial institutions of judging whether the nature 
of transaction raises suspicions. However, there is a risk of missing certain suspicious money 
laundering transactions because financial institutions may lack the capacity or expertise to 
analyse the suspicious funds or transactions.  
In fact, the determination of suspicious transactions can be based upon the customer profile 
obtained through the CDD process. It means the obligation of reporting suspicious transactions 
can be a part of the extended requirement of CDD in some situations (Stessens, 2000, p. 162) 
The obligation of applying an enhanced CDD process in certain circumstances takes precedence 
over the obligation of reporting suspicious transactions.  
 
5. The Impact of the preventive measures on financial privacy  
The implementation of the preventive measures on financial service providers has raised 
controversial arguments about the risk of interference with financial privacy. Under the 
obligation of record keeping provided for in R11 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations (FATF, 
2012), the identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic competent 
authorities upon appropriate authority. The reporting obligation may conflict with the desire for 
financial privacy. The interactions between the obligations to take preventive measures and bank 
secrecy (a notable form of financial privacy) will be addressed in detail below. 
 
5.1 Concept and justifications for banking secrecy 
Although banking secrecy appears to have a long historical development closely associated 
with the history of banking, modern banking secrecy actually evolved after World War I 
(Chambost, 1983, pp. 3-8). It was not legally recognized in the form of banking secrecy law until 
the 1930s. The first banking secrecy law was enacted in Switzerland in 1934, but since then it 
has flourished in many other States around the world (Chambost, 1983, pp. 5-6; Gagnon, 1990). 
Whilst the meaning of banking secrecy has been widely understood as the principle of 
confidentiality in financial transactions, there is no comprehensive concept or description of the 
term “banking secrecy” at the international level (Ping, 2004, p. 376). In general, banking 
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secrecy law protects a range of aspects of the relationship between bankers and their customer 
that are expressed in two main rules (Ping, 2004, p. 376): i) the banker shall not disclose the 
customer’s financial information to interested parties, leaving aside a number of exceptions; and 
ii) the customer’s financial information shall be protected legally from the intrusion of other 
parties. 
Most States recognize and adopt some forms of banking secrecy based on a number of 
justifications (Chambost, 1983, pp. 91-259). The justifications vary from State to State, and thus, 
have resulted in a variety of legal bases for protecting banking secrecy at different levels of 
stringency. The justifications for banking secrecy derive from both the interest of the bank and 
its customers (Chambost, 1983, pp. 9-26). It should be recognized that although in certain States, 
banking secrecy is reinforced by statute and even protected by criminal sanction, it is not a part 
of universally accepted civil liberties or human rights (Moscarino, 1997, p. 177). According to 
English law, the banker-customer relationship is a contractual obligation, not an inalienable right 
(Ellinger et al., 2006, pp. 117-21). Similarly, under German banking law, the foundation of the 
banker-customer relationship is dependent on a “general banking contract” (Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 
127). 
Most individuals want to prevent their financial information from being accessible by other 
interested parties. The demand for financial secrecy arises from the personal, business, political, 
fiscal or criminal motivations (Walter, 1990, pp. 1-4). In a cashless society, where most financial 
transactions are conducted through the banking system, banking records can directly reflect 
many aspects of a customer’s affairs that he/she wants to keep secret. For instance, the financial 
records of a person can reflect his lifestyle, financial situation, or even every physical movement. 
Thus, organized criminals or political tyrants consider banking secrecy as a shield to hide and 
secure their assets. Money launderers rely on banking secrecy as a crucial tool facilitating their 
criminal activities. In addition, people possessing substantial wealth are often targets for 
criminals. Hence, these people often seek the skilled banking systems that provide strict banking 
secrecy. In response to the customer’s demand for financial secrecy, divergent national and 
international bankers have offered banking secrecy as a kind of product. They compete with one 
another in terms of quality or cost of this type of product. Further, desirable banking systems are 
usually located in countries renowned for their political, social, economic and monetary stability. 
11 
 
This explains why some countries, e.g., Switzerland, Luxembourg or Hong Kong are known as 
“banking secrecy havens” (Chambost, 1983, pp. 145-250).  
A number of countries have enacted strict banking secrecy laws with the aim of supporting 
their banking industries as well as their economies. Stringent banking secrecy has been used to 
attract foreign funds and to profit from the management of these funds (Moscarino, 1997, p. 
184). Some of these countries are located in the Caribbean and South Atlantic close to unstable 
Latin American governments and drug producing countries. They include Antigua, the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, and Panama. Their 
geographical proximity and their stringent banking secrecy make them desirable destinations for 
capital flight and the proceeds of crime (Walter, 1990, pp. 210-21). In these countries, the 
banking secrecy law is an essential legal instrument of the banking industry which is a major 
contributor to their economies. However, these “banking secrecy havens” appear to make 
transnational money laundering more rampant and serious (Young, 2013, p. 161).  
 
5.2 The instruments of banking secrecy 
States choose different instruments to enforce banking secrecy. The most basic level of 
banking secrecy is achieved through a direct instrument, such as some type of deposit account:  a 
“classic named account”, “numbered account” or account under a false name (Chambost, 1983, 
pp. 39-67).  
A “classic named account” allows withdrawal over the counter. A customer who wants to 
open this type of account normally has to provide his/her personal details, such as name, address, 
and a sample signature for the bank. The sample signature allows the cashier to recognize the 
customer when withdrawing cash over the counter.  
A “numbered account” or account held under a false name is an account where the holder is 
denoted for general purposes by a number or code, or sometimes a pseudonym. The identity and 
other personal details of the customer are known only to a limited number of bank staff members 
who are responsible for the relationship with the customer. Others, who process the transactions 
for the bank account, only know the number, code or pseudonym. A “numbered account” is a 
well-known direct instrument of banking secrecy protecting the customers from unauthorised 
disclosure. It was an essential banking secrecy instrument in the Swiss banking system from the 
1950s (Chaikin, 2005, pp. 101-02). Nonetheless, under pressure from the international 
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community, in 2003 Switzerland introduced its new Money Laundering Law which forces Swiss 
banks to reveal the name of customers when transferring money abroad. Though the numbered 
account has not disappeared entirely, customers are no longer able to hide their identity when 
making transactions abroad. 
The indirect instruments of banking secrecy include “shell companies” or “offshore captive 
banks” (Chambost, 1983, pp. 58-75). “Shell companies” or anonymous corporations are non-
publicly traded corporations, limited liability companies and other business entities (e.g., trusts) 
that have no physical presence other than a mailing address and generate little or no independent 
economic value. A financial institution may provide financial services for these entities, such as 
internet banking or currency exchange (Sharman, 2010, pp. 130-32). “Shell companies” may 
serve legitimate commercial purposes, such as: holding stock or intangible business assets, 
facilitating domestic and cross-border currency and asset transfers, and facilitating corporate 
mergers (Floros and Sapp, 2011, pp. 851-52). These companies are easy and inexpensive to set 
up and operate; beneficial ownership is securely anonymous, and transaction details can be 
concealed from regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Thus, this kind of company has been 
seen as a big business, and States compete at offering more secure anonymity along with other 
benefits in incorporation services. In the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and other States with lax 
incorporation requirements, “shell companies” are freely available to anyone with an internet 
connection and some money (Sharman, 2010, pp. 130-32). However, “shell companies” can aid 
criminals by providing the appearance of legitimacy and access to the national and international 
financial system through their bank accounts. “Shell companies” may be formed and then open 
corporate bank accounts for illegal purposes. The transactions processed through the corporate 
accounts of such a “shell company” are effectively untraceable and are thus very useful for the 
purpose of concealing criminal proceeds (Sharman, 2010, pp. 127-30). The US has recently paid 
more attention to the problems of “shell companies” as part of their on-going AML and 
combating terrorist financing initiatives. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of 
the US, stated that “lack of transparency in the formation and operation of shell companies may 
be a desired characteristic for certain legitimate business activity, but it is also a vulnerability 
that allows these companies to disguise their ownership and purpose” (FinCEN, 2006, p. 1). 
Furthermore, the problems of “shell companies” have been widely identified in various reports 
and research projects on combating some transnational crimes, such as: drug trafficking-related 
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crimes, terrorism, money laundering, corruption, or tax evasion (Sharman, 2010, p. 129). As a 
result, a number of international legal instruments have obliged financial institutions that the 
beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangement must be ascertained (R10, 22, 24 
and 25 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations). 
Another indirect instrument of banking secrecy is “captive bank”, which is a bank that exists 
purely for the benefit of one natural or legal person or a group of people (Walter, 1990, pp. 43-
44). Traditionally, it is the wholly of partially owned subsidiary of a company. For example, A, 
B and C are companies that belong to Mr X who also controls captive bank D. Bank D is 
established primarily to fulfil the financial requirements of Mr X’s companies. It generally offers 
all basic banking services (e.g., safe-keeping of deposits). In some cases, it may provide 
additional services, for example merchant banking. To maximize profits, captive banks are 
usually offshore banks located in “tax havens”. An offshore “captive bank”, which is resident in 
a “tax haven”, may enjoy various benefits (Walter, 1990, pp. 43-44), such as lax tax liability and 
greater privacy resulting from the stringent banking secrecy laws in the country of location. This 
kind of bank obviously provides a useful tool for money launderers. 
 
5.3 Preventive measures challenging banking secrecy  
Because banking secrecy has been exploited as an effective tool to secure the proceeds of 
crime, in most jurisdictions there are certain compulsory circumstances in which banking secrecy 
is lifted or relaxed to serve the fight against crime. The information disclosed by the banks and 
used by competent authorities is very important in protecting the bankers as well as in AML. 
Lifting banking secrecy under certain circumstances has also been embodied in a number of 
international legal instruments with the aim of cooperating in the fight against transnational 
crime (e.g., article 5(3) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (UN, 1988); and R10 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations). 
Under the international AML regime, national banking systems cultivating a tradition of 
stringent banking secrecy now have to harmonize with the new international standard of banking 
secrecy. The preventive measures, especially the reporting obligation, raise controversial 
questions whether there are conflicts between this obligation and the demand of banking secrecy, 
and whether this obligation has negative effects on the commercial interests of bankers (Ping, 
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2004, p. 380). The answers to these questions will depend on what the reported information is 
about, who it concerns, and what it will be used for. 
It is noteworthy that the objectives of the preventive measures taken by banks not only serve 
the AML initiatives but also protect the banks from reputational damage, loss of public 
confidence or other damages resulting from being used for criminal purposes. Thus, banks 
should implement the preventive measures in compliance with international standards in order to 
protect themselves from the harms of money laundering. Further, the adequate implementation of 
the preventive measures has been seen as a market tool to guarantee the stability and health of 
banks in the global financial market (Verhage, 2008, p. 10).   
However, bankers should not have to lift banking secrecy in unreasonable situations. For 
example, the lack of the appropriate standards of suspicious transactions may result in 
unreasonable reports being made to law enforcement agencies. These reports may affect the 
interests of the banker and its customers because of the financial information disclosed. The 
extent to which banking secrecy is relaxed depends on the balance between the interests of law 
enforcement and bankers. For instance, absolute banking secrecy should not exist when there is a 
criminal threat to the banking system; or when the higher interest of the public or State such as in 
case of fighting against crime is involved. Nevertheless, in practice, it is difficult to find the right 
balance between the two potentially competing interests (Ping, 2004, p. 380). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In brief, ensuring the adequate implementation of the preventive measures is highly important 
for financial institutions to be secure from money laundering. Nonetheless, the enforcement of 
these measures is becoming much more intrusive into financial privacy which are themselves 
strongly justified by legitimate and undisputed rationales. This leads to tension and potential 
conflicts of interests between law enforcement authorities and financial service providers, 
between the protection of privacy rights and the objectives of the preventive measures. In 
practice, financial privacy should be weighted fairly against the objectives of preventive 
measures in AML. In addition, financial institutions should be equipped with sufficient means 
and capacity for effective customer identification to prevent the risk of becoming involved 
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